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THE STREAMLNING OF ATTACIHIENT PROCEDURE
JOHN F. X. FINNt
The FowuNr LAw REEvw welcomes the opportunity to publicze a
proposed bill, sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, which would materially a-ezd the Attachment Laws of New York.
Professor Finn establishes the proposition that statutory changes are in:-
perative. The FoRDHAm LAW RE ViEW ull appreciate any comment or
criticism of the proposed changes in Attachment procedurc.-EDOvRxo .
NOTE.
IT WAS Lord Mansfield, an expert in legalistic streamlining, who
said:
"I never like to entangle justice in matters of form.
It only tends to ruin . . and destruction."'
In recent days bar associations and legal thinkers generally have been
concentrating upon the elimination of procedural red tape. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the reports of Law Revision Commissions
and Judicial Councils give testimony of the spirit of the times. The
most recent notable accomplishment in the attack has been the adoption,
in New York, of a modernistic "Interpleader" device- which has already
earned the approbation of the courts
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Trueman v. Fenton, 2 Cowp. 544, 547, 93 Eng. Reprints 1232, 1233 (K. B. 1777).
2. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr (1939) §§ 287a, 287b, 287c 287d, 287e (dealing with specific
personal property within the state, including certificates of stock, bonds, notcs or other
securities). N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr (1939) § 51a (dealing with money obligations). See
Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts in New York (1926) 35 YA=E L. J. 6S9; Com-
ment, Statute of Liritations-Protection of Resident Debtors Against Adverse Clahns of
Non-Residents (1939) 39 CoL. L. Rnv. 1061; Comment, The Statute of Limitations and
Interpleader (1939) 14 ST. Jom's L. REv. 221; cf. Johnson, Attachnment of Choses in Action
in New York (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv. 371. And see the Federal Interp.eader Act
which permits a stakeholder to interplead a non-resident claimant in the federal court,.
49 STrA. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1939).
3. Klein v. Freund & Co., N. Y. App. Div., First Department, Nov. 13, 1939. In this
case a New York textile company owed $23,000 to a firm in Czechoslovada. After the
incorporation of that country into Germany, the head of the firm fled to Paris and there
assigned the claim to a New York resident who brought action against the textile company.
At the same time, however, claim was made upon the defendant in the name of the firm
in Czechoslovakia, and also by a bank located in Prague. Under the new legilation the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
It is now proposed that this device, which may well serve as a model
for the entire nation, be supplemented by a renovation of the "Attach-
ment" articles of the New York Civil Practice Act.
The objectives of the renovation, suggested and planned by the Com-
mittee on Law Reform of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York,4 are principally these three:
1. Simplification of the procedure for levying attachment.
2. Definition and clarification of the method by which a claim
made by another than the defendant in the attachment action
may be tried, when such other person claims the property held
under a levy of attachment.
3. Safeguarding of the attachment garnishee (such as the de-
fendant's debtor) and of others who may be affected by a levy
i cases where adverse claims are made to the property attached.
To attain such objectives, since all attachment procedure exists only
through statute, a legislative bill has been drafted, which is appended
hereto with appropriate comments of the Committee immediately fol-
debtor either pays the money into court or files a bond. Non-resident claimants may be
served by registered mail with notice of pendency of the action and if they do not appear
within a year their claims are barred by limitation. The money is then paid to
the plaintiff and the defendant is free of a possible second suit. If the other claimants
do appear, their rights inter se are determined by the court, and the debtor eventually
pays the successful claimant. In the instant case the Appellate Division held that in order
to invoke the new statutes a New York ddbtor is not required to show, as formerly In
interpleader proceedings, that there is a reasonable basis to the multiple claits---the mere
making of such claims is deemed sufficient for the granting of relief. Lieberman v. Parsons
& Whittemore, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Sept. 28, 1939, p. 855, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.); Reiss v. S. S.
Steiner, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 11, 1939, p. 347, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Krafft v. S. S. Steiner,
Inc., N. Y. L. J., Nov. 18, 1939, p. 1694, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.); cf. Anninger v. Hohenberg, N. Y.
L. J., Dec. 8, 1939, p. 2032, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.), reargument granted and decision adhered
to, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 22, 1939, p. 2276, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Loeb v. Bank of Manhattan Co.,
N. Y. L. J., June 30, 1939, p. 3022, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Stern v. Steiner, N. Y. L. J., April 20,
1939, p. 1810, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). The lasf case was decided prior to the amendments of
June, 1939. See REP. No. 206, CowmnTEE ON STATE LEGISLATiOx, Ass'Nr or BAR or Crrv
oF NEw YoRx (1939) 513-518: "The bill would effectively remedy the dangerous 'double
liability' inherent in such situations."
4. The members of the Committee are: Charles H. Meyer, Chairman, J. Delafield Du
Bois, George I. Genung, Henry Clay Greenberg, George N. Hamlin, John H. Johnson,
Horace S. Manges, MacNeil Mitchell, Carl Pack, Albert Parker, Harvey Reeves, Abraham
Rotwein, Milton Shalleck, William E. Shrewsbury, and Paul Van Anda. Davidson Som-
mers is an auxiliary member concerned with the "Attachment" revision. The proposal
was approved by the Association at a meeting held on December 12, 1939, after having
been withdrawn for further study at a stated meeting held on April 11, 1939. Such further
study, included an examination of the attachment laws of twenty-four states. As stated
by former Chief Judge Crane in the foreword to the Nichols-Cahili Civil Practice Acts, "New
York has been a pioneer in the domain of practice."
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lowing each section in which changes are proposed. This draft attempts
to afford plaintiffs the full advantage of the attachment statutes, to
provide defendants with adequate protection where needed, and to remove
inconsistencies, anomalies and technicalities which "eat like rust into
the substance of justice."'
1. Simplification of the Procedure for Levying Attachment
A progressive step forward was taken in New York when an amend-
ment to Section 916 of the Civil Practice Act afforded a plaintiff free
access to intangible assets by way of attachment "without reference to
the fading fiction of domicile."6 But not all of the barnacles have been
scraped from the hull of the procedural ship. Most notable among them
is the primitive doctrine of Anthony v. Wood7 to the effect that it is
necessary for the sheriff in levying upon personal property capable of
manual delivery to take it into his actual custody, no matter what the
circumstances.
In that case a promissory note was held by an agent, and the sheriff
sought to levy upon it. He demanded possession of the note but the
agent refused to surrender it. The sheriff thereupon obtained an order
from the court requiring the agent of the defendant to deliver the note
into the possession of the sheriff. In the meantime, however, the de-
fendant debtor had assigned the note. The sheriff obtained possession
of the note under his order but it was held that he had no lien upon
the note either by virtue of the original demand, since he did not take
the note into his custody, or by his subsequently obtaining the custody
of the note, as at that time the instrument was not the property of the
defendant. The court said:
"We have nothing to do with the wisdom of the rule. We can only enforce
it as it is plainly written." s
5. People v. Tweed, 5 Hun 353, 353 (N. Y. 1875).
6. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 818. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 704. ConMder the effect of
this amendment on Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924);
id., 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745 (1928) ; Stine v. Greene, 65 App. Div. 221, 72 N. Y. Supp.
729 (1st Dep't 1901); Chrzanowska v. Corn Exchange Bank, 173 App. Div. 239, 159 N.
Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't 1916); Cohn v. Enterprise, 214 App. Div. 238, 212 N. I. Supp.
39 (1st Dep't 1925); Clinton Trust Co. v. Compania, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 4, 1939, p. 958,
col 5 (Sup. Ct.); id., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 7, 1939, p. 1020, col. 6 (Sup. CL); Bluebird v.
Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 249 N. Y. Supp. 319 (City Ct. 1931); Murtaugh v. Yokohama, 149
Mlisc. 693, 269 N. Y. Supp. 65 (City Ct. 1933).
7. 96 N. Y. 1S0 (1884); cf. Johnson v. Kalisak, 90 Mcisc. 597, 599 (App. Term 1915)
(premises locked); Goll v. Hinton, S Abb. Pr. 120, 121 (N. Y. 1858); Burkhnrdt v. San-
ford, 7 How. Pr. 329, 339 (N. Y. 1852).
8. Anthony v. Wood, 90 N. Y. ISO, 187 (1884). See also Hes v. Hez3, 117 N. Y. 306
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Perhaps even more outmoded are the Columbia Spinning cases.0 The
first case holds that no valid levy results when a sheriff serves a certified
copy of a warrant together with a copy of the moving papers and a
notice but omits taking manual possession for the sole reason that the
agent of the debtor untruthfully denies that he has any of the debtor's
personal property capable of manual delivery. The court stated, forsooth,
that "The sheriff in this case might have taken steps to discover the
truth; .. . the trouble with the appellant's case is that there is no
possibility of making the levy unless the officer does the precise thing
which the statute requires."'"
The second Columbia Spinning case holds that even if a sheriff puts
a keeper into possession of 256 cases of yarn in a warehouse no valid
levy can result if a warehouseman's lien exists, because it is impossible
to have "a double possession in custody at the same time by both the
sheriff and warehouseman under different liens and different rights"."
Such philosophy has resulted in statutes to the effect that a valid
attachment levy is impossible if a negotiable warehouse receipt has been
issued, unless the receipt is surrendered to the warehouseman or its
negotiation enjoined and the receipt is either surrendered up or im-
pounded by the court.' So with other negotiable documents of title.13
(1889) and Rinchey v. Stryker, 28 N. Y. 45 (1863) to the effect that a sheriff does not
make a valid levy if he fails to get actual custody even where the goods and chattels
have been fraudulently assigned by a debtor to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. Note
that N. Y. Penal Law § 1171 stamps as a misdemeanor an attempt to remove property
from the state to defeat an attachment, but applies only to a defendant and not to a third
person. Although "in misdemeanors all are principals." N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 27, 1936,
1930 (3). And see N. Y. PmA. LAW §§ 1873, 1290 (2); N. Y. Jun. LAW §§ 750 (4),
753 (1).
9. Robinson v. Columbia Spinning Co., 23 App. Div. 499, 49 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1st Dep't
1897); id., 31 App. Div. 238, 52 N. Y. Supp. 751 (1st Dep't 1898); cf. Smith v. Orser,
42 N. Y. 132, 136 (1870); Elias v. Steel Furniture Co., 131 Misc. 941, 943, 229 N. Y.
Supp. 261, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
10. Robinson v. Columbia Spinning Co., 23 App. Div. 499, 503, 49 N. Y. Supp. 4, 7
(1st Dep't 1897).
11. Id., 31 App. Div. 238, 243, 52 N. Y. Supp. 751, 755 (1st Dep't 1898).) Cf. Penn-
sylvania Co. v. United Railways, 26 F. Supp. 379 (D. Me. 1939) (hypothecated shares of
stock in a Maine corporation held not attachable). In Lowenthal v. Hedge, 120 App. Div.
304, 105 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1st Dep't 1907), it was held that a subsequent removal from
New York of pledged property, where attachment had been effected through service on
the pledgee, would defeat the jurisdiction of the court.
12. N.Y. GEN. BUSINESS LAW §§ 110, 111; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw §§ 120, 121.
13. Bill of lading, N. Y. PEas. PRop. LAw §§ 210, 211, 120, 121; shares of stock, N. Y.
PERs. PROP. LAW § 174; American Surety Co. v. Kasco Mills, Inc., 262 N. Y. '585, 188
N. E. 75 (1933). As stated in the Commissioners' Note respecting Section 24 of the Uni-
form Bills of Lading Act: "If the mercantile theory of documents of title, such as bills
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The rule thus legislatively established in these few instances would not
be changed by the proposed revision. It must be admitted, however, that
these laws, standing alone, did but add further inconsistencies to the
attachment statutes. Confusion is made worse confounded by the fact
that a transferee's title may be defeated by attachment if a bill of lading
is non-negotiable' 4 but by statutory definition a provision in certain bills
that they are non-negotiable "shall not affect .. negotiability":1
On occasion a court struggles to find "actual custody" in the absence
of actual removal if the officer has the property in full view and is "in
a position" to take full possession and control.' The sheriff has also
been permitted to drill open a safe deposit box in order to get custody1
But important commercial interests should hardly depend upon such a
paucity of authority as exists.
Another barnacle on the procedural ship is the doctrine that "an
attachment is leviable only on legal interests and does not extend to
equitable interests" in personalty.' The proposed statutes would har-
of lading and warehouse receipts, were carried to its logical extent, no attachment of the
goods represented by the document or levy upon them could be permitted while the
negotiable document was outstanding. For the mercantile theory proceeds upon the as-
sumption that a negotiable document of title represents the goods and may be cafely dealt
with on that assumption. For one and the same reason the law cannot permit the balee
to deliver the goods without taking up an outstanding negotiable receipt for them, or allow
attachment or levy upon the goods, when they are reprezented by outstanding negotiable
documents." 4 U. L. A. 44-45. Of course, the service of a warrant of attachment and
the surrender of a bill of lading need be only reasonably concurrent, since such service and
surrender "are not ceremonies, to be ritualistically performed in that order." Ratto v.
Italia, 171 Mlisc. 426, 430, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 617, 620 (City Ct. 1939), a.F'd by App.
Term, First Dept., May 24, 1939.
14. N. Y. Pans. PRop. LAw § 219.
15. N. Y. PEas. PRop. L.w § 191 (as amended by N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 76). Cf. Gubel-
man v. Panama R. Co., 192 App. Div. 165, 1S2 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dzp't 1920).
16. Mlatter of Kogan, 141 Misc. 412, 415, 252 N. Y. Supp. 116, 119 (Sup. CL 1931);
cf. Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. 446 (N. Y. 1830); Butler v. Maynard, 11 Wend. 543
(N. Y. 1S32); Bond v. Willett, 31 N. Y. 102 (1865); Roth v. Wells, 29 N. Y. 471 (1864);
Haggerty v. Wilber, 16 Johns. 287 (N. Y. 1819); Ray v. Harcourt, 19 Wend. 495 (N. Y.
1835); Barker v. Binninger, 14 N. Y. 270 (1856).
17. Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N. Y. 187, 148 N. E. 185 (1925),
aff'g 212 App. Div. 150, 207 N. Y. Supp. 624 (1st Dep't 1925).
18. Fiske v. Parke, 77 App. Div. 422, 423, 79 N. Y. Supp. 327 (Ist Dep't 1902); Judis
v. Martin, 218 App. Div. 402, 213 N. Y. Supp. 423 (1st Dep't 1926), appeaZ dimsrnied, 244
N. Y. 605, 155 N. E. 916 (1927) ; (interest of beneficiary in a testamentary trust) Bates v.
New Orleans R. R., 13 How. Pr. 516 (N. Y. 1856) (contingent right to surplus from sale
of bonds not owned by attachment debtor); McFadden v. Innes, 60 Misc. 543, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'd without opation, 130 App. Div. 880 (1st Dep't 1909)
(right of vendor to possible increase in purchase price of land as result of resurvey where
land was sold by acre, and estimated price was paid); Finn v. Brown, 257 App. Div. 51,
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monize the attachment law with the Personal Property Law, the Debtor
and Creditor Law,19 the General Business Law and similar statutes. It
would unify methods of attachment of a debt represented by (a) a
negotiable instrument, (b) a non-negotiable instrument and (c) an
account or demand. It would extend the right to attach to other classes
of assignable property. And above all, it would root out the peculiarities
in the present law which make a distinction between the method of
levying an attachment upon tangible property and upon intangible prop-
erty. The former can now be levied upon as heretofore indicated, only
by seizure of the property by the sheriff, while the latter is now levied
upon merely by the service of a certified copy of a warrant upon the
holder of the property, without any notice whatever to the defendant.
It is not presently required that a copy of the moving papers accompany
such warrant or be forwarded to the defendant. The distinction between
the two types of property contemplated by the act is tenuous, as for
example, bonds held by a banker or broker as collateral are not property
capable of manual delivery if there is an unpaid loan outstanding, since
the attachment is on the equity,2q--but, if they are held with no claim
by the banker or broker, they are capable of manual delivery. In most
instances, moreover,--and particularly in larger cities, the sheriff cannot
get immediate access to tangible property to seize it, yet if publication
be necessary, property must be levied upon within thirty days to enable
the plaintiff to secure an order of publication. 21 Furthermore, the holder
of property is under no compulsion not to transfer tangible property
(capable of manual delivery) after service upon him of a warrant but
12 N. Y. S. (2d) 150 (2d Dep't 1939); Finn v. Dillon, 159 Misc. 396, 287 N. Y. Supp. 858
(City Ct. 1936) (trust funds). N. Y. PANmis=n LAW § 51c. Barry v. Fisher, 39 How.
Pr. 521 (N. Y. 1870) (partner's interest in partnership); Reifman v. Warfield Co., 170
Misc. 8, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 591 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (contingent and equitable obligation of
New York Cocoa Exchange). In Pennsylvania Co. v. United Railways, 26 F. Supp. 379
(D. Me. 1939) it was held that pledged shares of a Maine corporation cannot be attached
because an equity of redemption in personalty was never attachable at common law and
no statute covered the matter. Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr § 913 (equitable interest in land);
Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden, 266 N. Y. 44, 193 N. E. 633 (1934) (future receipts of
rodeo); Arter v. Jacobs, 226 App. Div. 343, 234 N. Y. Supp. 357 (3d Dep't 1929) (con-
ditional vendee's interest in chattel).
19. N. Y. DEwR AND CREDITOR LAW § 278 (1b) provides: "Rights of creditors whoso
claims have matured. 1. Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor,
such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser
for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one
who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser. . . .b. Disregard
the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property conveyed." (Italics In-
serted).
20. Castriotis v. Guaranty Trust Co., 229 N. Y. 74, 127 N. E. 900 (1920).
21. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACr §§ 232 (6), 905.
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before the sheriff has secured actual custody, since such property has
not yet been "attached". 2 There is no good reason why the plaintiff's
right to secure property by attachment within the jurisdiction, in satis-
faction of his claim, or even the duties of the attachment garnishee should
be subject to such peculiar exigencies. The distinction between the
method of making a levy on tangible property and intangible property
should be abolished, and the levy in the first instance should be made
on either type of property by service of a certified copy of the warrant
upon the holder thereof. In more fairness to the defendant than the
present law manifests, moreover, a copy of the warrant and moving
papers should in either event be served upon or forwarded to the de-
fendant whose property is attached, or at least procedure should be
provided by which the defendant can be reasonably assured of having
immediate access to the papers.
As an alternative to the method of levy by service of a certified copy
of the warrant, it should be possible for a levy to be made in the first
instance on property capable of manual delivery, by seizure, if so re-
quested by the plaintiff. This alternative provision would preserve such
advantages as may now, exist in the comparatively small number of cases
wherein seizure in the first instance is possible.
As above indicated, the New York Personal Property Law, Section
174 (Uniform Stock Transfer Law) provides that no attachment or levy
upon shares of stock for which a certificate is outstanding, shall be valid
unless the certificate is actually seized, or its transfer by the holder be
enjoined. A warrant of attachment served upon the holder of a certi-
ficate of stock under the proposed revision would enjoin the holder from
transfer; and similarly the duties of the holder of negotiable documents
of title would be defined. This procedure is desirable also in regard to
any other property held.
It has always been the duty of the sheriff ultimately to secure pos-
session of the property and to collect debts, effects and things in action.
In fact, only thus can a judgment be satisfied when obtained. There
is, however, no present limit as to the time in which such an action or
special proceeding must be commenced to secure property which the
sheriff has not been able to seize. For the advantage of the plaintiff
and of any attachment garnishee, the proposed revision would provide
that the sheriff, or the sheriff and plaintiff jointly, should proceed
promptly to obtain control over property attached, and it has fixed the
limit for the commencement of such action to ninety days after levy,
with appropriate provision, however, for extension of time should it be
22. Cf. authorities cited in note 8, suPra.
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impossible to commence an action within that time. Such extension of
time would prolong the duties of the holder of property not to transfer
the same. If no steps were taken by the sheriff, or plaintiff and sheriff
jointly, the levy would become void.
All of the foregoing indicates that the proposed streamlining of
attachment procedure would produce not only a smoother procedural
style but an attachment mechanism far more effective, practical and
just than any which now exists. It would have the added advantage
of being geared to the times and adjusted to the warning of Cardozo
that "precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not
fit the conditions of ... today".23
2. Definition and Clarification of the Method of Determining Third-
Party Claims to Property Attached
In 1936 New York amended the method by which a third party could
make claim to ownership of property attached as that of the defendant.
Previous procedure had provided for the impanelling of a sheriff's jury.
The procedure adopted in 1936, however, appears not to have been
extensively used, the reasons apparently being that (a) it can be invoked
only when the sheriff has property in his custody; (b) the procedure
and the rights of the parties seem somewhat indefinite; and (c) if a
trial is had, the judge, in his sole discretion, may impanel a jury. The
proposed changes in this procedure would place upon the third party
claimant the duty of making an application for an order awarding to
him the property levied upon, and would permit the court to fix the
amount of the bond if plaintiff desires to give one, or set the matter
down for a trial of the issue, at which time either side may demand a jury.
3. Protection of the Attachment Garnishee When Adverse Claims
Against Him Are Made
In the case of an action in aid of attachment to procure property
which is claimed by someone other than the defendant, the proposed
revision grants to the attachment garnishee protection against adverse
claims, by permitting procedure under Section 51-a of the Civil Practice
Act, which became law in June, 1939, and any other appropriate pro-
cedure for the adjudication of adverse claims. The attachment garnishee
is also given the right to vacate the attachment if the papers appear to
be defective; the warrant, however, to be valid as against all persons
until vacated or modified.24
23. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 391, 111 N. E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
24. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr §§ 924-927 apply only to personalty. N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr
§ 948 affords relief only to person acquiring interest in the property alter levy is made.
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There is a superstition in some quarters that "you cannot interplead
the sheriff". The superstition is contrary to the fact.
In The American Trust & Savings Bank v. Thahcimcer, the Appellate
Division modified an order of the Special Term so as to provide that
the Sheriff of Onondaga County and certain other persons be substituted
as defendants in the place of the defendant Thalheimer, upon his paying
into court the sum in controversy, and that the action proceed against
such other defendants alone and that the defendant Thalheimer be dis-
charged from liability to the plaintiff and to the Sheriff and the other
defendants. The court said:
"The sheriff as such is a proper party defendant, as he has attached the funds
and has an interest in the result. (Simons v. Hearn, 17 N. Y. Supp. 847)." - o
Sirons v. Hearn27 was an appeal by the plaintiff from an order of
the Special Term substituting the Sheriff in the place and stead of the
defendant. The action was brought against the defendant to recover a
sum of money in his hands. Prior to the commencement of the action,
the Sheriff had served upon the defendant a warrant of attachment
against the said fund. The defendant moved for an order interpleading
the Sheriff and permitting him to deposit the funds into court and be
discharged from further liability, which the court granted. Affirming
the order, the court said:
".... The sheriff and the plaintiff herein claim the same thing, viz., the $75.08
sued for herein. The defendants are willing to pay to the person entitled
thereto said fund, but cannot without risk and hazard to themselves determine
which one of the claimants is entitled to it. There is no collusion between
them and the sheriff. Under these circumstances the order appealed from was
properly granted. Crane v. McDonald, 118 N. Y. 654."- s
In San Fernando Heights Lemon Co. v. Fruit Auction Co.,- the court
granted a motion by the defendant for an order of interpleader substi-
tuting as parties defendant the City Marshal and another, where it
appeared that the plaintiff was suing for a sum of money which the
City Marshal claimed by reason of the service of a warrant of attach-
ment upon the defendant.
Corpus Juris, in discussing the persons subject to interpleader, says:
Brooklyn v. Newmann, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 24, 1936, p. 1355, col 5 (Sup. Ct.). Cf. Berheley
v. Epstein, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 21, 1939, p. 740, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.).
25. 29 App. Div. 170, 51 N. Y. Supp. 813 (4th Dep't 1S93).
26. Id. at 174, 51 N. Y. Supp. 813, at 816.
27. 17 N. Y. Supp. 847 (City Ct. 1892).
28. Ibid.
29. 174 N. Y. Supp. 156 (City Ct. 1919).
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"A sheriff who has attached the fund is a proper party defendant, as he has
an interest." 80
Section 134, subdivision 6 of the Banking Law provides that, in all
actions against a bank to recover moneys on deposit therewith, "if there
be any person or persons not parties to the action, who claim the same
fund, the Court in which the action is pending, may" make such claim-
ants parties defendant thereto. Such provision is all inclusive; it pro-
vides that any person who claims the same fund may be made a party
defendant. Clearly, the Sheriff claims a portion of the fund which he
seeks to attach. It is immaterial whether or not he claims to be bene-
ficially entitled to the fund. He asserts his claim on behalf of the attach-
ing creditor. If the defendant refused to pay the Sheriff, the attaching
creditor would commence an action by the Sheriff as plaintiff in aid of
the attachment. To obviate the necessity of having to defend such an
action brought to recover the money on deposit, the defendant is entitled
to an order of interpleader, making the Sheriff as well as the other
claimants, additional parties to the action.
The proposed statutory revision would codify these rules of law and
allay the confusion which today exists in connection with them.
It is to be hoped that in connection with the revision the Legislature
will find it possible to solve the conundrum as to what constitutes a "juris-
dictional defect" in attachment papers which precludes their amendment
after a motion to vacate or modify has been made.81 The present pro-
posal has not attempted to attack this problem, undoubtedly because
its solution might require amendments to other than the "Attachment"
articles of the Civil Practice Act. The fundamental dilemma as to what
constitutes a "jurisdictional defect" is, of course, not limited to attach-
ment actions.
30. 33 C. J. 449.
31. In Kibbe v. Wetmore, 31 Hun. 424 (N. Y. 1884) a warrant of attachment was
granted on the basis that the defendant was a non-resident. On a motion to vacate It was
clearly shown that defendant was a resident. The attaching creditor then presented affida-
vits to show that the defendant was removing property from the state with intention to
defraud creditors and conceal, and so forth. The court granted an amendment of the
original warrant. Cf. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 196 App.
Div. 766, 188 N. Y. Supp. 623 (1st Dep't 1921); Cole v. Nash Motors Co., 131 Misc. 922,
229 N. Y. Supp. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1928); McGovern v. Christian Bahnsen, Inc., 153 Misc.
224, 274 N. Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Kennedy v. Lamb, 182 N. Y. 228, 74 N. E.
834 (1905); N. V. Tonerde v. Great Lakes, 243 App. Div. 640, 276 N. Y. Supp. 895 (2d
Dep't 1935); Dicoa Co. v. Kokomo, 249 App. Div. 645, 291 N. Y. Supp. 422 (2d Dep't
1936); Fried v. Continental Casualty Co., 155 Misc. 487, 279 N. Y. Supp. 916 (Mun. Ct.
1935); Adam Hat Stores v. Lang, 155 Misc. 587, 280 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Term 1935);
Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 160 Misc. 487, 290 N. Y. Supp. 16 (Sup.
Ct. 1936), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 786, 288 N. Y. Supp. 736 (Ist Dep't 1936).
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In the following summary of the proposed revision attention is par-
ticularly called to the "Comment' which follows each proposed statute:
TABLE INDICATING THE SECTIONS OF THE NEW YORK
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT REFERRING TO ATTACHMENTS,
FROM SECTIONS 902 TO 948, INCLUSIVE, IN WHICH NO
CHANGE IS SUGGESTED, AND THOSE IN WHICH PRO-
POSED CHANGES ARE MADE. WHERE THE HEADING OF
THE SECTION IS ALSO CHANGED, THE PROPOSED NEW
HEADING IS USED.
Sections as to Which No Change
Is Suggested
§ 903. What must be shown to
procure warrant of attachment.
§ 904. Warrant in action for pecu-
lation and deceit.
§ 905. Service of summons if war-
rant previously granted.
§ 907. Terms of undertaking on
obtaining warrant.
§ 908. Security not required in
certain actions for peculation and
deceit.
§ 909. Issuance and attestation of
warrant.
§ 911. Validity of undertaking.
Sections as to Which Changes
Are Suggested
§ 902. In what actions attachment
of property may be had.
§ 906. Papers to be filed.
§ 910. Contents
whom directed.
of warrant; to
§ 913. What interest in real prop-
erty may he attached.
§ 912. Duties of Sheriff in execu-
tion of warrant.
§ 914. Unpaid subscription to for-
eign corporation subject to attach-
ment.
§ 915. Shares of stock and bonds
or interest therein subject to attach-
ment.
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§ 916. Debt or evidence thereof;
cause of action on contract, debt;
claim to estate or trust fund; subject
to attachment.
§ 918. Certificate of defendant's § 917. Method of making levy.
interest to be furnished.
§ 919. Examination of person re-
fusing certificate.
§ 920. Transportation of goods in
vessel without interruption, neverthe-
less warrant; exceptions. § 921. Inventory.
§ 922. Actions and special pro-
§ 923. Perishable goods and ani- ceedings by Sheriff.
mals to be sold.
§ 924. Claim to property by third
person.
§ 925. Action against Sheriff by
third person claiming property.
§ 926. Indemnity to be furnished
to the Sheriff.
§ 927. Discharge of personal
property from attachment.
§ 928. Proceedings on claim to
domestic vessel.
§ 929. Appraisers of vessel to be
sworn; valuation to be returned.
§ 930. Undertaking to be given
by claimant of vessel.
§ 931. When vessel to be dis-
charged.
§ 932. When undertaking for dis-
charge of vessel to be sued.
§ 933. Defense in action upon
undertaking for discharge of vessel;
recovery.
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§ 934. Valuation of foreign vessel.
§ 935. Undertaking by plaintiff
after valuation of foreign vessel.
§ 936. When foreign vessel to be
discharged.
§ 937. Terms on which debtor may
claim foreign vessel.
§ 938. Sale of foreign vessel, for
lapse of claimant's remedy, after
undertaking by plaintiff.
§ 939. Sale of attached vessel, do-
mestic or foreign.
§ 940. Sheriff to keep property.
§ 941. Order for payment into
court or deposit of money.
§ 942. Delivery of release of sur-
plus money or property.
§ 943. Action by plaintiff and
sheriff jointly.
§ 944. Procuring leave to unite
with Sheriff, in bringing suit.
§ 944 (a). Defenses to action or
proceeding to perfect levy.
§ 945. Joinder of plaintiff with
Sheriff after action is begun.
§ 946. Court control of action by
plaintiff and sheriff.
§ 947. Return of inventory; how
enforced.
§ 948. Application to vacate or
modify warrant, or increase security.
(Matter in brackets is to be omitted. Matter in italics is to be added.)
AN ACT to amend and clarify certain sections of articles fifty-four,
fifty-five and fifty-sx of the civil practice act relating to attachments,
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executing warrants of attachments and vacating or modifying warrants
of attachments.
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and
Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Section nine hundred and two of the civil practice act is
hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 902. In what actions attachment of property may be had.
A warrant of attachment against the property of one or more de-
fendants in an action may be granted upon the application of the plaintiff,
as specified in the next section, where the action is to recover a sum of
money only, as a tax or as damages for one or more of the following
causes:
1. Breach of contract, express or implied [, other than a contract
to marry].
2. Wrongful conversion of personal property.
3. An injury to person or property in consequence of negligence,
fraud or other wrongful act.
4. A wrongful act, neglect or default by which the decedent's death
was caused, when the cause of action arose in this state and the action
is brought by an executor or administrator against a natural person
who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an action in
favor of the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued.
COMMENT: The phrase "other than a contract to marry" is
obsolete. No contract to marry operates under the Laws of New
York to give rise either within or without the state to any cause or
right of action for the breach thereof. Article 2-A, civil practice
act, paragraphs 61-a to 61-i.
Section 2. Section nine hundred and six of the civil practice act is
hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 906. Papers to be filed; service of papers upon defendant on demand.
The plaintiff procuring the warrant must [cause the affidavits and
papers comprising the proof upon which it was granted to be filed in
the office of the clerk], within ten days after the granting thereof [.J
, cause to be filed in the office of the clerk, the summons issued in the
action, the complaint, if any, and a copy,of the undertaking given upon
the warrant, unless no undertaking is required pursuant ta sections nine
hundred and four and nine hundred and eight of this act, and any and
all affidavits or other written evidence and exhibits thereto comprising
the proof on which the warrant was granted. The said warrant, however,
notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiff so to file, or any other deject
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or omission in the granting or issuance thereof or levy thereunder, shall
be and remain, valid as to each person holding property subject to attach-
ment of, or indebted to the defendant, on whom a certified copy of the
warrant of attachment is served, as hereinafter in section nine hundred
and seventeen provided, until an order vacating or modifying the same
shall have been duly made and entered, and a certified copy thereof
with notice of entry, served upon such person.
The court, in its discretion, for good cause shown, may, if the sub-
stantial right of any party is not thereby prejudiced, with or without
terms, permit the filing of any or all of the papers herein designated
after the expiration of the period of ten days.
Not more than one day after service upon plaintiff or his attorney
of a written demand by the defendant or his attorney, made after levy
on property of defendant has been effected under a warrant of attach-
rent, the plaintiff shall cause to be delivered or mailed to the defendant,
at the address specified in such demand, a copy of all papers hereinabove
designated, comprising the proof upon which the warrant was granted;
and upon plaintiffs failure to comply with such demand, the court or
judge, in its or his discretion, may order that any or all levies under
said warrant be vacated.
The demand by or on behalf of the defendant shall not be deemed
an appearance in the said action, nor a designation of a manner or
method of service of process.
COMMENT: Since some confusion has existed as to the proper
procedure for filing attachment papers under section 906 and rule
80, the section has been clarified by defining exactly what papers
must be filed.
The person on whom a warrant is served may believe that the
papers are not properly issued or have other defects in them. The
amendment provides clearly that the warrant is valid until vacated
or modified. This is consistent with section 911, which provides
that a bond given on an improperly issued warrant is valid. A
later section grants to the person on whom a warrant, apparently
defective, is served, the right to move to vacate it.
The provision for notice to the defendant is suggested in fair-
ness to the person who is most concerned about the attachment.
The present law provides for no notice to him whatever, either in
the case of tangible property or intangible property.
Section 3. Section nine hundred and ten of the civil practice act is
hereby amended to read as follows:
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§ 910. Contents of warrant; to whom directed.
The warrant may be directed either to the sheriff of a particular
county, or, generally, to the sheriff of any county[.] [It] , and warrants
may be issued at the same time to sheriffs of different counties. Tho
warrant must require the sheriff to attach and safely keep, so much of
the property or interest therein within his county, subject to attachment,
which the defendant has, or which he may have, at any time before final
judgment in the action, as will satisfy the plaintiff's demand, with costs
and expenses. The amount of the plaintiff's demand must be specified
in the warrant, as stated in the proofs on which the warrant was granted.
[Warrants may be issued at the same time to sheriffs of different
counties.]
Simultaneously with, or at any time after, the issuance of a warrant
of attachment, the plaintiff may, in writing, specify particular personal
property to be attached as the property of the defendant, or as property
in which the defendant has an interest subject to attachment, whether
or not the property so specified is held in the name of, or otherwise
appears, to be the property of the defendant, and deliver the said writing
to the sheriff. When levy is made upon the said specified personal prop-
erty, or any part thereof, a copy of said writing, specifying the said
specific personal property, shall accompany the certified copy of the
warrant left by the sheriff with the person holding the said personal
property specified therein, or any part thereof, or delivered to the person,
if any, from whose possession the said property, or any part thereof,
is taken, as the case may be. A copy of the said writing must be filed
by the plaintiff in the office of the clerk within ten days after delivery
by him to the sheriff. The warrant of attachment and any tevy there-
under shall apply to all property of the defendant subject to attachment,
whether or not so specified, unless the writing specifically limits its
effectiveness to such specified property.
COMMENT: There is no statutory provision by which a plaintiff
may attach property of the defendant, but not standing in the de-
fendant's name, unless the same can, in the first instance, be seized
by the sheriff. A practice has grown in instances of this kind, by
which the plaintiff will give a written notice of such property to
the sheriff, who serves the notice with the warrant, upon the holder
of the property. If the levy be otherwise complete, the property
thus specified is attached. This procedure has had the approval
of our courts. Cotnareanu v. Chase, 271 N. Y. 294. The older
cases seem to imply that the sheriff must point out each particular
piece of property which he attaches. Clarke v. Goodridge, 41 N. Y.
210; Gittings v. Russell, 114 App. Div. 405; 187 N. Y. 538.
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The suggested revision is intended to do no more than codify
the rule of practice approved by the Court of Appeals. If the
property seized is not, in fact, the defendant's the claimant has his
remedies. It is believed the holder of such property would have
complete protection under the warrant and injunction (provided in
proposed section 917) against the transfer. Experience has shown
that the situation above referred to will normally occur only in
very few instances.
It is also believed that this provision is consistent with section
278 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, which provides that in case
of fraudulent transfer, the creditor may ignore the transfer and
attach the property, which in such instance obviously would stand
in the name of the transferee and not the defendant.
Section 4. Section nine hundred and twelve of the civil practice act
is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 912. [Manner of attaching property and duties of sheriff, generally.]
Duties of sheriff in execution of warrant.
The sheriff must execute the warrant immediately, by levying, in the
manner prescribed in section nine hundred and seventeen of this act,
upon so much of the [personal and real] property of the defendant,
within his county, subject to attachment, [not exempt from levy and
sale by virtue of an execution,] as will satisfy the plaintiff's demand,
with the costs and expenses. [He must take into his custody all books
of account, vouchers, and other papers, relating to the personal prop-
erty attached, and all evidences of the defendant's title to the real
property attached, which he must safely keep, to be disposed of as
prescribed by this act.]
If levy be made upon personal property capable of manual delivery,
by the sheriff taking the same into his actual custody, he must, without
delay, deliver to the person, if any, front whose possession the property
is taken, a certified copy of the warrant. In all other cases where per-
sonal property is levied upon by him, the sheriff must, upon making
such levy, or as soon thereafter as may be practical, take into his actual
custody all personal property capable of manual delivery, and, waithout
delay, subject to the direction of the court or judge, collect, receive and
enforce all debts, effects and things in action levied upon by him.
The sheriff, to whom a warrant of attachment is delivered, may levy,
from time to time, and as often as [is] may be necessary, until the
amount [for which it] of plaintiffs denand for which the warrant was
issued, with costs and expenses, has been [secured], levied upon or final
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judgment has been rendered in the action, notwithstanding the expiration
of his term of office.
Subsequent levies under the same warrant shall apply only to property
not subject to any previous levy under said warrant.
COMMENT: (a) The heading has been changed for greater
accuracy.
(b) Present Section 912 requires the sheriff to levy upon prop-
erty of the defendant "not exempt from levy and sale by virtue
of an execution". Certain property is attachable which is not
subject to such levy and sale as, for example, a bank account.
(c) Experience has shown that the provision requiring the sheriff
to take into custody books of account, etc. is seldom used, and
that in any event the information therein contained can be obtained
by examination. Seizure of such papers and records may be con-
sidered an unlawful search and seizure and one which would cause
unnecessary hardship to the defendant. In this connection see
Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N. Y. 187. For those
reasons the provision that the sheriff must take into custody books
of account, etc. is omitted.
(d) The language of the second paragraph is taken from Sections
917(2) and 922 with appropriate changes. Proposed Section 922
is confined to the actions and special proceedings which the sheriff
may take in performance of his duties.
Section 5. Section nine hundred and fourteen of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 914. [Attachment of unpaid subscription to foreign corporation.]
Unpaid subscription to foreign corporation subject to attach-
ment.
Under a warrant of attachment against a foreign corporation, other
than a corporation created by or under the laws of the United States,
the sheriff may levy upon the sum remaining unpaid upon a subscription
to the capital stock of the corporation, made by a person within the
county; or upon one or more shares of stock therein, held by such a
person, or transferred by him, for the purpose of avoiding payment.
thereof.
COMMENT: The heading of this section has been changed for
clarity. No other change is made.
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Section 6. Section nine hundred and fifteen of the civil practice act
is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 915. [Levy upon interest in shares or bonds.]
Shares of stock and bonds or interest therein subject to
attachment.
The [rights or] shares [which] of stock owned by the defendant [has
in the stock of an] of any association or corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of this or any other state, or any foreign country,
or [in] a bond, negotiable or otherwise, or any interest in or to such a
share or bond or to the right to the issuance of such a share or bond,
together with [the] any interest, dividends and profits then due and
accrued thereon, may be levied upon, as hereinafter provided; and the
sheriff's certificate of the sale thereof entitles the purchaser to the same
rights and privileges, with respect thereto, which the defendant had when
they were so [attached] levied upon.
COMMENT: Certificates of stock, if found within the county, are
subject to attachment. Rights to the issuance of stock are also sub-
ject to attachment and levy may be made by service on the proper
officer of the corporation. Issued certificates not within the county
cannot be attached, nor can the rights to the issuance be attached
if the corporation cannot be served within the county.
The suggested changes are for greater clarity, and to avoid any
possible conflict with the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act; New York Personal Property Law, Sec. 174.
'Section 7. Section nine hundred and sixteen is hereby repealed, and
article fifty-five of the civil practice act is hereby amended by inserting
therein a new section to be section nine hundred and sixteen to read
as follows:
[§ 916.] [Levy upon cause of action, evidence of debt or claim to
estate.]
[The attachment may also be levied upon a cause of action arising
upon contract; including a bond, promissory note, or other instrument
for the payment of money only, negotiable or otherwise, whether past
due or yet to become due, executed by a foreign or domestic government,
state, county, public officer, association, municipal or other corporation,
or by a private person, either within or without the state; which belongs
to the defendant and is found within the county. Within the meaning
of this section there shall be included any indebtedness due or to become
due from a non-resident or foreign corporation, upon whom or which
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service of process may be made within this state, to any person whether
a non-resident or foreign corporation. The levy of the attachment there-
upon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure and attachment of, the debt
represented thereby. The attachment may also be levied upon a right
or interest, present or future, to any. of the property or estate of a de-
ceased person which may belong to the defendant and which could be
legally assigned by him as legatee or distributee, whether the same exists
by reason of the provisions of a last will and testament admitted to pro-
bate at the time the attachment is granted, or by operation of the law
in case of the intestacy of the deceased. Levy of the attachment there-
upon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure and attachment of, the rights
and interests of the defendant at the time of such levy, subject to the
rights of the executor, administrator or trustee of such estate to admin-
ister the same according to law.]
§ 916. Debt or evidence thereof; cause of action on contract, debt;
claim to estate or trust fund; subject to attachment.
The attachment may also be levied upon:
1. A debt, arising under or on account of a contract, represented
by a negotiable bond, promissory note or other negotiable instrument
for the payment of money only, whether past due or yet to become due,
executed either within or without the state by a foreign or domestic
government, state, county, public officer, association, municipal or other
corporation, or by a private person, by levying upon the said bond,
promissory note or other instrument for the payment of money only, if
the same 'belongs to the defendant and is found within the county. The
levy of the attachment upon the said bond, promissory note or other
negotiable instrument for the payment of money only, shall be deemed
a levy upon, and a seizure of all of the defendant's rights arising by
reason of said instrument in and to the debt represented thereby.
2. A debt, arising under or on account of a contract, represented
by a non-negotiable bond, promissory note or other non-negotiable in-
strument for the payment of money only, whether past due or yet to
become due, executed either within or without the state by a foreign
or domestic government, state, county, public officer, association, muni-
cipal or other corporation, or by a private person, either by levying
upon the said non-negotiable bond, promissory note or other non-
negotiable instrument for the payment of money only, if the same be-
longs to the defendant and is found within the county, or by levying
upon the debt represented thereby if service of process may be made
within the county upon the person against whom the debt exists. The
levy of the attachment either upon the said non-negotiable bond, promis-
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sory note or other non-negotiable instrument for the payment of money
only, or upon the debt represented by suck non-negotiable instrument,
shall be deemed a levy upon, and a seizure of all the rights of the de-
fendant arising by reason of said non-negotiable instrument in and to
the debt represented thereby.
3. A debt, arising under or on account of a contract, not represented
by a bond, promissory note or other instrument for the payment thereof,
negotiable or otherwise, whether or not the said debt is past due, or
yet to become due, to a resident or non-resident person or corporation,
from a resident or non-resident person or corporation, upon whom or
which service of process may be had within the county, provided that
an action could be maintained by the defendant within the state for
the recovery of such debt at the maturity thcreof or where the debt
consists of a deposit of money not to be repaid at a fixed time but only
upon a special demand, that such demiand therefor could be duly made
by defendant within the state. The levy of the attachment thereon is
deemed a levy upon, and a seizure of all the rights of the defendant in
or to the said debt.
4. A cause of action, arising under or on account of a contract,
other than specified above, whether accruing within or without the state
to a resident or non-resident person or corporation against a resident
or non-resident person or corporation, upon whom service of process
may be had within the state, provided that the defendant could prosecute
an action thereon within the county. The levy of the attachment there-
upon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure md attachment of all the rights
of the defendant in and to such cause of action.
5. A right or interest, present or future, to or in any of the property
or estate of a deceased person, which may belong to the defendant and
which could be legally assigned by him as legatee or distributee, whether
the same exists by reason of the provision of a last -will and testament
admitted to probate at the time the attachment is granted, or by opera-
tion of law in case of the intestacy of the deceased. The levy of the
attachment thereupon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure and attach-
ment of the rights and interest of the defendant at the time of such
levy, subject to the rights of the executor, administrator or trustee of
such estate to administer the same according to law.
6. A right or interest, present or future, of the defendant to or in
any property or fund, other than a decedent's estate, held or controlled
by a fiduciary, by whatever name described, which could be legally
assigned, released or alienated by the defendant. The levy of the attach-
ment thereupon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure and attachment
of the rights and interest of the defendant at the time of such levy,
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subject to the rights of the said fiduciary to administer the same accord-
ing to law.
COMMENT: Present section 916 is capable of an interpretation
which would give the attaching creditor greater rights in property
of the defendant within the county, than the defendant himself
has, and permit an action in aid of attachment to collect debts
which the defendant himself could not recover within the county.
It is clearly not the intention of the section, and is also contrary
to decided cases.
The purpose of this somewhat extended revision of this section
is intended to give to the attaching creditor all rights which present
section 912 purports to give him, except those which an attaching
creditor clearly does not have as defined by decided cases.
Section 8. Section nine hundred and seventeen of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 917. Method of making levy.
A levy under a warrant of attachment must be made as follows:
1. Upon real property, by filing with the clerk of the county where
it is situated, a notice of the attachment, stating the names of the parties
to the action, the amount of the plaintiff's claim, as stated in the war-
rant, and a description of the particular property levied upon. The
notice must be subscribed by the plaintiff's attorney, adding the office
address; and must be recorded and indexed by the clerk, in the same
book, in like manner and with like effect as a notice of the pendency
of an action.
[2.] [Upon the personal property capable of manual delivery, in-
cluding a bond, promissory note, or other instrument for the payment
of money, by taking the same into the sheriff's actual custbdy. He
thereupon, without delay, must deliver to the person from whose pos-
session the property is taken, if any, a copy of the warrant and of the
affidavits upon which it was granted.]
[3.] 2. Upon other [personal] property [, by leaving a certified
copy of the warrant, and a notice showing the property attached, with
the person holding the same; or, if it] subject to attachment, as follows:
Where the property consists of a demand other than as hereinafter
specified [in the last subdivision], by leaving a certified copy of the
warrant with the person against whom it exists; [or, if] where it consists
of a right or share in the stock of an association or corporation, or
interests or profits [thereon] therein, for which a certificate of stock is
not outstanding, with the president, or other head of the association or
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corporation, or a vice president, [or the] secretary, treasurer, cashier,
or managing agent thereof, or [if] where it consists of a right or interest
to or in an estate of a deceased person arising under the provisions of a
will, or under the provisions of law in case of intestacy, with the executor
or trustee under the will, or [the] administrator of the estate; or where
it consists of a right or interest to or in any property or fund other than
a decedent's estate held or controlled by a fiduciary, with said fiduciary;
'where it consistO of a debt represented by a non-negotiable bond, promis-
sory note or other "non-negotiable instrument for the payment of money
only, by leaving a certified copy of the warrant of attachment with the
holder of such non-negotiable instrument thereof or with the person
against whom such debt exists; or where it consists of a negotiable
bond, promissory note or other negotiable instrument for the payment
of money, or a certificate representing a share or shares in the stock of
an association or corporatin, with the person holding the same; upon all
other kinds of property, with the person holding the same.
A levy made by service of a certified copy of a warrant of attachment
shall not apply to any property of the defendant or to any interest of
the defendant therein or debt owing to him, held or owed by the said
person where said person has, at the time of such service, no knowledge
or reason to believe that the said property, interest therein or debt,
belongs or is owing to the said defendant or that defendant has any
interest therein subject to attachment unless such property shall be
specified in a writing accompanying the certified copy of the warrant.
Any such person so served with a certified copy of a warrant of
attachment is forbidden to make or suffer, any transfer or other disposi-
tion of, or interfere with, any such property or interest therein so levied
upon, or pay over or otherwise dispose of any debt so levied upon, or
sell, assign or transfer any right so levied upon, to any person, or per-
sons, other than the sheriff serving the said warrant until ninety days
from the date of such service, except upon direction of the sheriff or
pursuant to an order of the court. Any such payment, sale, assignment
or transfer shall nevertheless be valid as to the payee or transferee
thereof.
The prohibition, as provided in this section, shall not prevent a person
upon whom a warrant of attachment has been served, as herein provided,
who, at the time of service thereof, has in his possession or under his
control an instrument belonging to the defendant, or in which the de-
fendant has an interest, received by him for collection or redemption,
from collecting, presenting or redeeming the same, whether negotiable
or otherwise, nor shall it prevent such person holding property of any
sort of the defendant as collateral or otherwise, from selling and trans-
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ferring the same in good faith pursuant to the pledge thereoj, or at the
direction of any person who would, except for the attachment, be
authorized to direct the sale or transfer thereof, provided, however, that
the fair value or market price therefor be received; and provided, fur-
ther, that the proceeds of such collection, redemption or sale, in excess
of the amount necessary to satisfy the said pledge, if any, be retained
by the said person subject to the said prohibition, nor shall the said
prohibition be deemed to diminish any rights of the holder of slich
property, if a creditor of defendant, granted to a creditor under any
law of this state.
3. If the plaintiff or his attorney shall so direct in writing, and shall
furnish the sheriff indemnity satisfactory to him, a levy may also be
made upon personal property capable of manual delivery, including a
bond, promissory note or other instrument for the payment of money,
or a certificate representing a share or shares in the stock of an asso-
ciation or corporation, by the sheriff's taking the same into his actual
custody.
4. Upon property discovered in any action brought as prescribed
in subdivision [two] three of section nine hundred and twenty-two of
this act, by entering in the proper clerk's office the judgment rendered
in said action, and thereafter levying on said property in the manner
prescribed in subdivisions one, two [and] or three of this section,
COMMENT: (a) The method of levying upon real property is
unchanged. The distinction in the different methods of making a
levy on property capable of manual delivery and property incapable
of manual delivery, has been abolished. The levy is made by serv-
ing a warrant of attachment upon the person holding property of
the defendant or indebted to the defendant, i.e., levy is made in
the first instance upon all property in the manner now prescribed
for levy upon intangible property.
(b) Upon property capable of manual delivery, the sheriff may
also levy in the first instance by seizure, if so directed by the plaintiff.
(c) The provision of Section 917, as now written, respecting
the method of attaching shares of stock, has been overruled by the
case of American Surety Co. v. Kasco Mills, Inc., 149 Misc. 10;
237 App. Div. 880, aff'd. 262 N. Y. 585, since it is in conflict
with the Uniform Stock Transfer Act; New York Personal Prop-
erty Law Sec. 174.
(d) Upon stock certificates, levy can be made only by
(aa) Seizure;
(bb) An injunction against the holder.
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Service of the warrant, in the section as proposed, is an injunc-
tion for a period of ninety days against the holder. This injunctive
provision, it is believed, will be of use in levying upon bonds and
other instruments in addition to certificates of stock.
(e) It must be recognized that an attachment is not a replevin;
it seeks merely to secure such property as will be available for
satisfying the judgment. Therefore, in case of items for collection
and the like, permission is given to continue collection, provided
the proceeds are retained subject to the attachment, and provided
that a fair market value is received.
(f) No penalty is provided for wrongful transfer by the attach-
ment garnishee of property levied upon, since Section 753 of the
Judiciary Law seems to provide sufficient penalties for transfer of
such property. Lowenthal v. Hodge, 105 N. Y. Supp. 120 (App.
Div. First Department, 1907).
(g) Levy on property capable of manual delivery in the first
instance, by service on the holder, it is believed, will obviate the
difficulty now sometimes existing of perfecting such a levy within
thirty days which is necessary in order that the court have juris-
diction to issue an order of publication against a non-resident.
Section 232, subdivision 6, civil practice act; Dimmerling v.
Andrews, 236 N. Y. 43.
(h) It is believed the revisions will give greater effectiveness to
levies, and at the same time greater protection to the holders of
tangible property not now levied upon until after the sheriff has
secured manual custody. Anthony v. Wood, 96 N. Y. 180, 187;
Robinson v. Columbia Spinning Co., 23 App. Div. 499, 503; Robin-
son v. Columbia Spinning Co., 31 App. Div. 238.
(i) The last subdivision is unchanged except for numbering of
the section and change of number of references to other sections
of the civil practice act in that section.
Section 9. Section nine hundred and twenty-one of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 921. Inventory.
The sheriff, immediately after levying under a warrant of attachment,
must make, with [the] such assistance [or two disinterested freeholders]
as he may require, a description of the real property, and a just and
true inventory of the personal property and all other property subject
to attachment, upon which it was levied, [and of the books, vouchers,
and other papers taken into his custody] stating therein the estimated
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value of each parcel of real property attached, or of the interest of the
defendant therein, and of each article of personal property, enumerating
such of the latter as are perishable [.] , and of any other property sub-
ject to attachment or of the interest of the defendant therein. The
inventory must be signed by the sheriff and by the appraisers [; ], if any,
and, within five days after the levy, must be filed in the office of the
clerk of the county where the property is attached. If the only property
levied upon be a debt, no inventory shall be required.
COMMENT: The phrase "with the assistance of two disinterested
freeholders" is obsolete. It would seem sufficient if the sheriff is
permitted to secure such assistance of appraisers as he may need.
An inventory of a debt, i.e., bank account and the like, can serve
no useful purpose. Objections have been made that the inventory
in such an instance is an unnecessary expense to the plaintiff.
Section 10. Section nine hundred and twenty-two of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 922. Actions and special proceedings by sheriff.
[1.] [The sheriff, subject to the direction of the court or judge, must
collect and receive all debts, effects and things in action, attached by
him. He may maintain any action or special proceeding, in his name
or in the name of the defendant, which is necessary for that purpose
or to reduce to his actual possession an article of personal property,
capable of manual delivery, but of which he has been unable to obtain
possession. He may discontinue such an action or special proceeding
at such time and on such terms as the court or judge directs.]
1. In the event that the person owing any debt to the defendant,
or holding property, effects or things in action of the defendant or inter-
est therein subject to attachment, on which a levy under a warrant has
been made, as in this act provided, shall fail or refuse to deliver such
personal property attached, or to pay or assign to the sheriff the said
debt, effect or thing in action, or interest therein, the sheriff may, and if
indemnified by the plaintiff as hereinafter provided, must, within ninety
days after the service of the certified copy of the warrant on such person,
commence an action or special proceeding to reduce to his actual custody
all such personal property capable of manual delivery, and to collect,
receive and enforce all debts, effects and things in action attached by
him, and may maintain any such action or special proceeding in his
name or in the name of the defendant for that purpose. lie may dis-
continue such an action or special proceeding at such time and on such
terms as the court or judge directs. The sheriff shall not be obliged to
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commence any such action or special proceeding to reduce such personal
property capable of manual delivery to his actual custody or to collect,
receive or enforce debts, effects or things in action of the defendant
unless the plaintiff or his attorney requests in writing that such action
or special proceeding be commenced, and indemnifies the sheriff for all
necessary expenditures incurred or to be incurred by him in connection
therewith in manner satisfactory to him or fixed by the court.
The service of process commencing such action or special proceeding
against any person upon whom a certified copy of a warrant of attach-
ment shall have been served, shall continue as against that person during
the pendency of said action or special proceeding all duties and liabilities
imposed upon him in the first instance by the scrvice of the said war-
rant of attachment upon him.
The time within which such action or special proceeding, as heren-
before provided, may be commenced shall be extended beyond the period
of ninety days from the date of the service of the said warrant only
by order of the court for good cause shown. Such an order may be
granted upon ex parte application of plaintiff. An order thus extending
the time within which such gn action or special proceeding may be
commenced shall be effective to continue all duties and liabilities of any
person on whom a warrant of attachment in the action has been served,
provided that a certified copy of the said order is, prior to the expiration
of the said ninety days, served upon said person. If notice of the appli-
cation is served upon such person five days before the return date thereof
and prior to the expiration of said ninety days, such notice shall extend
all said duties and liabilities until ten days after an order determining
the motion shall have been entered.
2. In the event that within ninety days from the issuance of the
warrant, unless the time has been extended as herein provided, and in
that event prior to the expiration of the time as so extended, the sheriff
has not taken into his actual custody all such property capable of manual
delivery, or has not received payment of, or an assignment evidencing
the right of, the sheriff to collect and to enforce the debts, effects or
things in action attached, and if no action or special proceeding for that
purpose has then been commenced by the sheriff or by the plaintiff
jointly with the sheriff, as herein or hereinafter authorized, the levy
shall be void as to any such personal property not so reduced to the
sheriff's custody, paid, collected or assigned to him and after the ex-
piration of such time the sheriff shall have no right thereunder to take
into his actual custody any such property capable of marual delivery,
or to collect or receive any such debts, effects or things in action, nor
shall the sheriff or the sheriff and plaintiff jointly, have any right to
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commence an action or special proceeding thereunder to secure or collect
the same.
[2.] 3. Where the summons was served without the state, or by
publication, pursuant to an order obtained for that purpose, as prescribed
by law, and where the defendant has not appeared in the action, other-
wise than specially, but has made default and before entering final
judgment, the sheriff, in aid of such attachment, may maintain an action
against the attachment debtor and any other person or persons, or
against any other person or persons, to compel the discovery of any
thing in action, or other property belonging to the attachment debtor;
and of any money, thing in action, or other property due to him, or
held in trust for him, or to prevent the transfer thereof, or the payment
or delivery thereof, to him or any other person, and the sheriff, in aid
of such attachment, also may maintain any other action against the
attachment debtor and any other person or persons which may be main-
tained by a judgment creditor in equity, either before the return of an
execution in aid thereof, or after the return of an execution unsatisfied.
The judgment in any of the above-mentioned actions must provide and
direct that the said property shall be applied by the sheriff to the satis-
faction of any judgment which the plaintiff may obtain in the attach-
ment action.
COMMENT: It has always been the duty of the sheriff to reduce
to his custody personal property capable of manual delivery in
order that the same may be sold to satisfy any judgment obtained
under the attachment action. It has also been his duty to collect
and enforce all debts, effects and things in action for the same
purpose (Section 917 and Section 922). The proposed section con-
tinues that duty, but places a time limit of ninety days in which
the sheriff must either secure the property or evidence that he has
a right to collect and enforce the same, or must start an action or
special proceeding to secure it if requested to do so by plaintiff
which gives proper indemnity. Extensions of time may be secured
for good cause shown. The injunction under which the attachment
garnishee is placed by the service of a warrant upon him, is con-
tinued pendente lite. Similar procedure is provided for actions of
sheriff and plaintiff jointly. Sec. 943-944 post. It is to the advan-
tage of both the attachment garnishee and the plaintiff, that any
question concerning the validity of the levy should be settled as
quickly as possible.
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Section 11. Section nine hundred and twenty-four of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 924. Claim to property by third person.
1. If personal property, other than a vessel, attached, seized or levied
upon, as the property of the defendant, is claimed by or [in] on behalf
of another person, as his property, [an affidavit shall be made and
delivered to the sheriff, on behalf of such person,] at any time [while]
after levy thereon and prior to the time when such property or the pro-
ceeds thereof, in case the property shall have been sold, [are in the
sheriff's possession, stating that he makes such a claim; specifying]
have been applied in satisfaction, or partial satisfaction of a judgment
obtained in the said action in which the warrant of attachment was issued,
the said person claiming the property may apply on affidavit in the
action in which the said property was attached, seized or levied upon,
for an order directing the sheriff to deliver the property to him, if in
his possession, or release such property from attachment, if not in his
possession, unless the plaintiff give to the sheriff indemnity against said
claim. The affidavit accompanying said application shall specify in whole
or in part the property to which it relates, and in all cases [stating]
state the value of the property claimed and the damages, if any, over
and above such value, which the claimant will suffer in case such attach-
ment, seizure or levy is not released. [In that case, the sheriff, in his
discretion, before he sells such property, or in case the property has
been sold, before paying out the proceeds from the sale thereof, may
serve upon the plaintiff's attorney a copy of the affidavit, with notice
that he requires indemnity against the claim. If the indemnity is not
furnished within three days after the demand has been made by the
sheriff, the sheriff, in his discretion, may deliver the property, or the
proceeds, as the case may be, to the claimant, without incurring any
liability to the plaintiff by reason of so doing; unless within three days
after demand for indemnity the plaintiff shall institute a proceeding for
the purpose of having the title to the claimed property or the proceeds
thereof, determined. The court, or judge, before whom the proceeding
is brought, shall hear and determine the title thereto, and for that pur-
pose the judge hearing the proceeding, may, in his sole discretion, impanel
a jury. If a jury is impanelled, the plaintiff shall advance the costs and
expenses thereof which shall be fixed by the judge hearing the pro-
ceeding.] The application must be made on at least five days' notice to.
the sheriff and to the plaintiff, and to the defendant if he has appeared
in the action. The judge hearing the application shall, at the request
of plaintiff fix the amount of indemnity to be furnished by him to the
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sheriff, and if no request is made by the plaintiff to furnish indemnity
and it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that there is reason
to believe the claimant is entitled to the said property attached, seized
or levied upon, the court must grant the application by the said third
party for the delivery of the property to him unless the plaintiff shows
such facts as may be deemed by the court sufficient to entitle him to a
hearing to try the title to the said property. An order as herein provided,
directing the sheriff to deliver the property to the claimant if it be in
the sheriff's possession, or releasing the property from attachment if not
within the sheriff's possession, shall relieve the sheriff or any person
holding the said property so released, or any part thereof, levied upon
subject to the warrant, from any liability to the plaintiff by reason of so
doing.
In the event the court shall direct that title to the said property be
tried, it shall fix the date and place for hearing thereon and shall specify
to whom notice shall be given and direct the method in which said
notice shall be given. The court or judge before whom the hearing shall
be held shall determine the title of the claimant in the property attached,
seized or levied upon, or so much thereof to which claim has been made
by the said claimant, and any party thereto within five days after service
of the order directing that title to the property be tried, with notice of
entry thereof, may demand a jury. The party so demanding the jury
shall advance the costs and expenses thereof which shall be fixed by the
judge hearing the proceeding. If, by such proceeeding it is determined
that the property belongs to the claimant, it shall be delivered to him
by the sheriff if in the sheriff's possession, and if not in his possession,
shall be released from the levy and the sheriff shall by such determina-
tion, and any person holding the said property or any part thereof, be
released thereby, from all claims for damages to the plaintiff. If by such
proceeding it is determined that the attachment, seizure, levy or sale
was valid, the sheriff shall proceed thereunder and the sheriff and any
person holding the said property shall be released from all liability to
the claimant by such determination.
A plaintiff who has specified particular personal property to be attached
as the property of the defendant, pursuant to section nine hundred and
ten, shall be liable in an action to the true owner thereof, if other than
the defendant, for any damage sustained by him by reason of the attach-
ment, seizure of, or levy upon said property as that of the defendant,
notwithstanding an order, decision or judgment hereunder directing that
the sheriff deliver the property to the claimant or to release the same
from levy or otherwise, nor shall any such order, decision or judgment
affect in any manner the right, if any, of the defendant in the attachment
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action in or to the property discharged from the attachment, nor shall
this section be construed as effecting or impairing any other right or
remedy which any person might othervise have in respect to the property
attached.
Within five days after the entry of the order in such proceeding, any
party thereto, upon notice to the other party or parties, may apply to
the court or judge for a stay, or may give an undertaking to stay fur-
ther proceedings, pending appeal. Such undertaking shall be not less
than twice the amount of the claimed value of the property and damages.
A person who shall falsely or fraudulently make a claim as prescribed
herein may be punished as and for contempt of court and shall be liable
in treble damages to the party injured thereby.
2. If any personal property attached, seized or levied upon is claimed
by or on behalf of another person, as his property, at any time after an
action or special proceeding has been commenced by the sheriff or by the
sheriff and plaintiff jointly, to reduce to sheriff's actual custody the per-
sonal property capable of manual delivery or to collect, receive and en-
force the debts, effects and things in action, as provided in this article,
the claimant, in addition to any other rights which he may have, may
intervene in any such action or proceeding then pending and assert
therein his right, title or interest in or to the said property.
COMMENT: Under the present section a person other than the
defendant who claims that the attached property belongs to him,
cannot commence procedure unless the property is in the sheriff's
possession. Under the revision it can be commenced at any time
after levy. The present procedure as provided in section 924 is
somewhat indefinite, permitting the sheriff "in his discretion" to
refer the claim to plaintiff, who thereupon must demand trial of
title or indemnify the sheriff. Under the proposed revision, the
claimant makes an application to have the property delivered to
him. This clearly submits him to the jurisdiction of the court. The
court fixes the bond, whereas it is now fixed by the sheriff, and if
a trial of the title be had, either side may demand a jury, which
now is in the sole discretion of the judge.
The adjudication under the new section determines the disposi-
tion of the property in respect to the attachment; rights of others
not party to the proceedings are not affected.
The procedure outlined in present section 924 has seldom been
used. It is believed that the new procedure will expedite the dis-
position of such claims.
A new subdivision has also been added, granting the claimant
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the right to intervene in any action or proceeding in aid of attach-
ment.
Section 12. Section nine hundred and twenty-five of the civil prac-
tice act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 925. Action against sheriff by third person claiming property.
A person who has claimed personal property pursuant to the provi-
sions of [the preceding] section nine hundred and twenty-four, and who
has [served an affidavit] made an application as prescribed therein, may
if indemnity has been given, as therein provided, maintain an action
against the sheriff who has held or sold property claimed, [if indemnity
has been given as therein provided,] to recover his damages by reason
of [levying] the levy upon such property [and] or of selling [such prop-
erty.] the same, if sold. The summons in such an action must be
[issued] served within [three] six months after the attachment, seizure
or levy upon the property [and must be served within three months after
it is issued]. An action cannot be maintained against the sheriff by a
person so entitled to make a claim except as prescribed in this section.
COMMENT: Section 925, as revised, is designed to avoid
anomalies.
Section 13. Section nine hundred and twenty-six of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 926. Indemnity to be furnished to the sheriff.
The indemnity to be furnished to the sheriff by the plaintiff, as pre-
scribed in section nine hundred and twenty-four, must consist of a
written undertaking to him, executed by at least two sufficient sureties,
to the effect that they will indemnify him against any liability for
damages, costs or expenses incurred in an action brought against him by
the claimant, or a person deriving title from or through the claimant by
reason of attaching, seizing, levying upon, or selling said personal prop-
erty, or delivering the proceeds thereof as the case may be, not exceed-
ing a sum to be specified in said undertaking, which must be at least
five hundred dollars and not less than twice the claimed value of the
property and the damages, if any, over and above such value. [Each
of the sureties, besides possessing the other qualifications required by
law, must be a freeholder of the sheriff's county.] The sheriff, before
selling the personal property or paying out the proceeds from the sale
thereof, as the case may be, may require the persons offered as sureties
to justify in the manner and subject to the provisions of statute or rule
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regulating generally the justification of sureties in an undertaking given
in an action or special proceeding. The sheriff shall be entitled to have
the sureties substituted as defendants in any action as prescribed in the
last section.
COMMENT: The provision that "the sureties must be freeholders
of the sheriff's county", is obsolete.
Section 14. Section nine hundred and forty-two of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 942. Delivery or release of surplus money or property.
If from the certificate given, as provided in section nine hundred and
eighteen hereof, or from the examination, as provided in section nine
hundred and nineteen hereof, or from any other proof satisfactory to the
court, it shall appear at any time after levy that property subject td
attachment has been levied upon, or that [Where] the proceeds of [the]
such property sold, and [the] demands collected by the sheriff, exceed
the amount necessary to satisfy [of] the plaintiff's demand, with [the]
costs and expenses, and of all other warrants of attachment or execu-
tions in the sheriff's hands chargeable upon the same[;], [the court, or
the judge who granted the warrant, upon the application of] the defen-
dant, [or of] an assignee of, or purchaser from the defendant, or any
person holding any property, debts, effects or things in action levied upon,
may apply to the court [and] upon notice to the plaintiff [,] and to the
[plaintiffs in the other warrants or executions, may make an order, at
any time during the pendency of the action,] sheriff, for an order releas-
ing from the levy of attachme.zt or directing the sheriff to pay over [the
surplus] or deliver, to the applicant, [and to release from the attach-
ment the remaining real and personal property attached.] so much of
the property levied upon as shall be found to be in excess of the amount
necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, with costs and expenses. Be-
fore granting such an order the court must direct that notice of the said
application be given to the plaintiff in other warrants, if any, or to judg-
ment creditors of executions, if any, to or on the said property sought to
be released.
COMMENT: Since the main purpose of an attachment action is
to seize security for the satisfaction of the judgment when obtained,
it is unreasonable that more property should be held subject to at-
tachment and levy than sufficient to satisfy the demand, with inter-
est, costs and expenses. The changes in this section provide a means
of releasing from the attachment property above that necessary for
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the purpose, and thus to prevent the use of attachments for the
mere harassment either of the defendant or of the attachment gar-
nishee.
Section 15. Section nine hundred and forty-three of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 943. Action by plaintiff and sheriff jointly.
The plaintiff, by leave of the court or judge, procured as prescribed
in the next section, may bring and maintain, in the name of himself and
the sheriff jointly, by his own attorney, and at his own expense, any
action which, by the provisions of this act, may be brought by the
sheriff, to recover property attached, or the value thereof, or a demand
attached, or upon an undertaking given as prescribed in this article, by
a person other than the plaintiff[;] . [the plaintiff, in his own name and
the sheriff's jointly, may also bring and maintain any action which, by
the provisions of subdivision two of section nine hundred and twenty-
two of this act, may be brought by the sheriff.] The sheriff must receive
the proceeds of such an action, but he is not liable for the costs [or]
and expenses thereof. Costs may be awarded in such an action against
the plaintiff in [the] a warrant, but not against the sheriff.
Any suck action which, by the provisions of section nine hundred and
twenty-two, might have been brought by the sheriff to reduce to the
sheriff's actual possession personal property capable of manual delivery,
and to collect, receive and enforce debts, effects and things in action at-
tacked by him, of which he has not secured actual custody, payment or
an assignment evidencing his right to collect and enforce the same, must
be commenced as against any person on whom a warrant of attachment
has been served within ninety days after the service of a certified copy
of a warrant on such person. The effect of the failure to commence such
action within the said period, unless the time has been extended; the
method of securing extensions of time therefor, and the obligations im-
posed thereby, and the effect of the commencement of such an action,
shall be the same as provided in said section nine hundred and twenty-
two for such actions brought by the sheriff solely.
COMMENT: An action in aid of the attachment by plaintiff and
sheriff jointly, has always been used where such an action is neces-
sary more than the procedure in section 922, where the sheriff
alone proceeds to collect debts, etc. This action must also be begun
in ninety days from the time of the issuance of a warrant, unless the
sheriff has succeeded in seizing property or collecting debts at-
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tached. The procedure for extensions of time and the like is the
same as in Section 922.
Section 16. Section nine hundred and forty-four of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 944. Procuring leave to unite with sheriff, in bringing suit.
The court or judge must grant leave to bring such an action[,] where
it appears that due notice of the application therefor has been given to
the sheriff; but, before doing so, the court or judge may require that
notice of the application be given to the plaintiff in any other warrant
against the same defendant [.] , [And] and such terms, conditions and
regulations may be imposed, in the order granting leave, as the court or
judge thinks proper [,] for the due protection of the rights and interests
of all persons interested in the property or in the disposition of the
proceeds of the action.
COMMENT: The procedure retained unchanged, but sufficient
changes within the section to be consistent with other proposed
sections of the act.
Section 17. Article fifty-five of the civil practice act is hereby amended
by inserting therein a new section to be section nine hundred and forty-
four-a, to read as follows:
§ 944-a. Defenses to action or proceeding to perfect levy.
In any action or special proceeding in aid of the attachment for the
purpose of reducing to the sheriff's actual custody such property capable
of manual delivery, and collecting and receiving by him any debts,
effects and things in action, the person against whom such an action or
special proceeding is brought may, in addition to such legal or equitable
defenses as he may have to such an action or special proceeding, plead
any defenses and make any application, by motion or otherwise, for
relief to obtain the determination of the rights, if any, of any adverse
claimants to said property or any part thereof which would be available
to him if such action or special proceeding were brought by or in the
name of the defendant in the attachment action.
COMMENT: At the February, 1939, meeting the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York approved a proposed bill for
improved procedure in avoiding double liability under adverse
claims. This proposed bill was passed and became a law in June,
1939, and is known as section 51-a of the civil practice act. Adverse
claims may also be made to property which the sheriff seeks under
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an attachment. The purpose of the new section is, therefore, to
grant such relief to an attachment garnishee under section 51-a,
and other appropriate sections as he would have if the defendant in
the action were suing to recover the property as his, and some other
person claimed the property as the owner.
Section 18. Section nine hundred and forty-eight of the civil practice
act is hereby amended to read as follows:
§ 948. Application to vacate or modify warrant, or increase security.
The defendant, or the person upon whom a warrant of attachment has
been served, or a person who has acquired a lien upon or interest in his
property after it was attached, may apply, at any time before the actual
application of the attached property or the proceeds thereof to the pay-
ment of a judgment recovered in the action, to vacate or modify the
warrant, or to increase the security given by the plaintiff, or for one or
more of those forms of relief, together or in the alternative.
COMMENT: The attachment garnishee is also given the right to
move to vacate the warrant or to increase security. While probably
of limited application, there seems no reason why, if the person on
whom a warrant is served is placed in the position of potential loss
or embarrassment, he should not have the right to appear in court
and move to vacate the warrant.
Section 19. This act shall take effect September first, nineteen hun-
dred and forty, provided, however, it shall not apply to any action or
special proceeding pending at the effective date hereof, nor to any action
or special proceeding thereafter commenced by or in connection with
any attachment action in which the warrant was issued prior to Sep-
tember first, nineteen hundred and forty.
Conclusion
Informed persons have been justly critical of the "mangled remains"
of attachment statutes which still remain upon the books despite limita-
tions upon them found in the cases and despite complications which they
have caused and will inevitably cause in the future. In some cases "com-
plete befuddlement" has resulted from them even after their subjection
to judicial analysis. No apology is needed for recommending the dissi-
pation of such befuddlement by the erasure of statutory anachronisms
from the New York Civil Practice Act or for suggesting that "so much
incomprehensible learning should be relegated to limbo
3 2
32. Johnson, supra note 2, at 404, 406.
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The life of the law is flux. And while back of precedents are juridical
concepts, still
"farther back are the habits of life, the institutions of society, in which
those conceptions had their origin, and which, by a process of inter-
action, they have modified in turn".3
33. CAmozo, TBE NATruR oF =n JuDciaL, PRocss (1921) 19.
